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Abstract: The extent to which human learning should be thought of in
terms of elementary, automatic versus controlled, cognitive processes is
unresolved after nearly a century of often ﬁerce debate. Mitchell et al.
provide a persuasive review of evidence against automatic, unconscious
links. Indeed, unconscious processes seem to play a negligible role in
any form of learning, not just in Pavlovian conditioning. But a modern
connectionist framework, in which “cognitive” phenomena are
emergent properties, is likely to offer a fuller account of human
learning than the propositional framework Mitchell et al. propose.
We should not be too harsh on ourselves for having failed, after a
century of study, fully to have worked out the basic nature (cog-
nitive or automatic) of human learning. Psychologists have been
struggling with this paradox ever since Thorndike ﬁrst formu-
lated the law of effect (Thorndike 1931; cf. Postman 1947;
Spence 1950).
The paradox is highlighted by the following facts:
1. As Mitchell et al. rightly point out, awareness appears to be
a necessary condition for learning. Their review focuses on con-
ditioning, but the point holds for many other forms of learning
such as speeded responding to structured materials (Perruchet
& Amorim 1992; Shanks et al. 2003), context-guided visual
search (Smyth & Shanks 2008), grammar learning (Tunney &
Shanks 2003), decision making (Maia & McClelland 2004), and
many others.
2. Learning is not an automatic process. It is controlled by
both bottom-up inﬂuences (by the stimuli and their relation-
ships) and by top-down ones (how the stimuli are perceived;
attention; expectancies; working memory capacity; and so on).
How could learning be automatic given the evidence that
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elsewhere (Macdonald & Lavie 2008)?
3. Many aspects of learning seem to involve reasoning. For
instance, after learning that two cues predict an outcome
(ATþ), presentation of evidence that one of them alone predicts
the outcome (Aþ) causes less predictive inﬂuence to be assigned
to T (Shanks 1985; Van Hamme & Wasserman 1994).
4. If by “reasoning” one means the manipulation of symbolic
representations, then much of cognition does not appear to be
well described as reasoning. The embodied cognition movement
has made it clear that many aspects of behaviour traditionally
interpreted in terms of inferences over amodal symbolic rep-
resentations are better explained via notions of mental simulation
(Barsalou et al. 2003; Niedenthal 2007). Moreover, logic-based
accounts of reasoning have been subjected to severe criticism
even in such central domains as reasoning about conditional
statements (“If A then B”) (Oaksford & Chater 2007).
5. Extraordinarily rich explanations of learning phenomena
have been achieved by models built out ofautomatic linkmachin-
ery (i.e., connectionism). Such models demonstrate massive
“emergentism,” in that processes that seem cognitive and high-
level emerge from the operations and interactions of very
elementary processing units. Indeed, these models can often be
viewed as operating in optimal (Bayesian) ways.
One way to resolve the paradox is to ignore (4) and (5) and
argue, as Mitchell et al. do, that the basic processes of associative
learning intrinsically embody the principles of reasoning. Indeed,
it is easy to combine a logic-based system (based on a computer
programming language for symbolic reasoning) with a Rescorla-
Wagner-like rule governing belief strength (Shanks & Pearson
1987), such that inference over propositions yields behaviour
with the appropriate level of strength.
Yet such a propositional framework for learning only scores 3
out of 5 on the list above. An alternative resolution which scores
rather better begins by noting that many things that are true of
automatic links are not necessarily true of larger-scale connec-
tionist models. Unlike automatic links, for instance, connectionist
models can represent semantic information. Indeed, if there has
been a single goal behind the connectionist movement, it has
been to emphasize this fact. Such models can “reason.” A
simple connectionist model described by Ghirlanda (2005)
explains the retrospective revaluation effect described in (3)
above, and some of the other reasoning-like effects described
by Mitchell et al. are beginning to be modelled in connectionist
systems (e.g., Schmajuk & Larrauri 2008). Unlike links, proces-
sing in connectionist models is often assumed to be related to
awareness (states of settled activity – attractor states – may be
just those states of which we are conscious). Unlike links, connec-
tionist models have no difﬁculty in binding top-down and
bottom-up inﬂuences. Many models incorporate pathways for
top-down attentional control. And so on. There is a long way to
go, but it is not inconceivable that such an approach will even-
tually make the paradox of learning dissolve.
Close examination of the empirical data also adds weight to the
view that at least some aspects of learning emerge from elemen-
tary link processes and questions the propositional reasoning
account. Quasi-rational behaviour, such as blocking, occurs not
only in intentional learning situations, but also in incidental
ones in which it seems very unlikely that the individual would
be motivated to “reason.” For example, in speeded reaction
time tasks in which some structural property is informative
about a target’s location, cue-competition effects are observed
(Endo & Takeda 2004). Such effects are well modelled in con-
nectionist systems (Cleeremans 1993).
Further evidence for link-like processes emerges in exper-
iments in which individuals judge event probabilities after
exposure to a cue-learning task. As Mitchell et al. explain, such
studies show that cue-outcome contingency has an impact on
probability estimates even when variations in contingency do
not affect the objective probabilities. Hence, if the probability
of an outcome given a cue, P(OjC), is say 0.75, participants’ judg-
ments will be greater when the probability of the outcome in the
absence of the cue, P(Oj~C), is 0 rather than 0.75 (Lagnado &
Shanks 2002). Mitchell et al. argue (sect. 5.2) that such effects
arise because of participants’ confusion or uncertainty about
the term “probability” in the experimental instructions. But
several studies (Nosofsky et al. 1992; Shanks 1990) show the
same bias in “implicit” probability estimates when probability
language is absent. In these conditions, participants choose
which of two outcomes is the correct diagnosis for a patient
with a certain symptom pattern. The word “probability” is not
even employed – participants are asked to choose which
outcome they think is correct. Such studies also challenge Mitch-
ell et al.’s suggestion that the effect is due to confusion about the
absence of other cues, as it also emerges when binary dimensions
are used in which there are no absent cues. These biases, which
fall naturally out of link-based models, are hard to reconcile with
propositional reasoning accounts.
How do we get from propositions to behavior?
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